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The empirical literature using large international students’ assessments tends to neglect the role of school 
composition variables in order not to incur in a misidentification of peer effects. However, this leads to an 
error of higher logical type since the learning environment crucially depends on peers’ family background 
and on peer heterogeneity. In this paper, using PISA 2006, we show how peer heterogeneity is a key 
determinant of student attainment and of opportunity equalization. Interestingly, the effect of school 
compositional variables differs depending on the country tracking policy: peer heterogeneity reduces 
efficiency in comprehensive systems whereas it has a non-linear impact in early-tracking ones. In turn, linear 
peer effects are larger in early-tracking systems. Besides, higher heterogeneity tends to equalize student 
differences related to family background. Results do not change in school- and student-level regressions 
suggesting that the impact of heterogeneity is correctly identified. Results are also robust when we add 
school-level dummies and several controls correlated with the school choice to alleviate the selectivity bias 
of linear peer effects.     
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1.  Introduction 
 
The quality of the educational system is commonly recognized to have a remarkable impact on 
growth and on the equalization of student outcomes. Large international assessment programs 
constitute a valid tool for analysing how differences in educational policies translate into different 
student outcomes, circumventing problems of skill comparability. Existing studies using these 
surveys attempt to reconcile the observed lack of correlation between resources invested and 
educational outcomes accounting for the institutional features of the educational process, such as 
the ones associated to the degree of autonomy of the school and of the accountability (e.g. 
Woessmann et al. 2010). Much less attention has been devoted to analyse the effect of the school 
(or class
1) composition by background and/or abilities —i.e. the so-called “peer effect”.  
By fostering or hindering skill formation, peer effects and social interactions have provided to 
be a fundamental source of both efficiency—if peer effects are non-linear (Benabou 1996)—and 
intergenerational inequality (Durlauf 2004). Moreover, especially up to the secondary level of 
education, the influence of the social background at school has been shown to be critical for the 
development of cognitive skills and therefore of labour market success (Carneiro and Heckman 
2003; Fernandez and Rogerson 1996; Hanushek and Woessmannn 2010). In spite of the well-
recognized importance of these effects, the limitation to the cross-sectional dimension and the lack 
of initial information on student ability makes it difficult to identify linear “peer effects” using these 
surveys. In particular, the fact that the assignment of students to classes and schools of different 
quality is endogenous severely distorts the estimation of peer effects
2.  
However, neglecting to account for the characteristics of the social interactions and, more in 
general, of the “external environment” at school can also raise serious biases in the estimates; at 
least as large as the ones that would emerge from not considering endogeneity issues in the 
                                                 
1 Note that peer effects at the class and the school level capture two different ways in which social interactions affect 
student outcomes: whereas the former is more correlated with direct effects on the learning environment, the second 
includes a broader set of interactions. 
2 For instance, since the school composition is endogenous both to educational policies, such as the admission 
procedures and the age of tracking, and to the characteristics of the neighbourhood of residence, the choice of the school 
would be strongly influenced by unobservable individual, parental and urban characteristics. An important caveat is 
required here. If the selection problem is not perfectly solved and hence identification of the peer is not transparent, the 
estimated coefficient on peer variable turns out measures both the school and the community peer effects (Toma and 
Zimmer 2000). The distinction of the two effects is crucial for targeting policies at the national level, whereas in 
international comparisons the exact estimates of the production function externalities generated at school, net of the 
community externality due the social interaction out-of-school, is far less important as urban and schooling policies are 
intrinsically indistinguishable. Another well-known problem is the one of reflexivity, namely each student outcome is 
affected by the average mean of the other student and at the same time affect the outcome of all other students, (Maskin 
1993). Due to the reflexivity problem, the data requirements for unbiased estimates of peer are almost impossible to 
meet. For policy purpose what is relevant is to quantify the peer effect, not to identify the source of it. Hence, many 
studies ignore the reflexivity problem.    Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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estimates of peer effects. So far, except for few recent cases
3, the mainstream empirical strategy in 
studies using large international assessment programs attempted to minimize the first-type of bias 
associated to an improper identification of peer effects. This, however, brings to a second-type of 
error, of higher logical level, associated to a misspecification of the true educational production 
function.   
The “error” made by not explicitly including “class- or school-compositional variables” is of 
great policy concern when the characteristics of the school environment are strongly linked with 
other policies that are found to affect the student choice. Of particular interest is the interaction 
between school compositional variables and tracking policies as long as the latter influence the 
school choice of students from different backgrounds (e.g. Dustmann 2004; Checchi and Flabbi 
2005). In turn, even in comprehensive systems –i.e. Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian ones where 
school tracking is absent – there might be a strong tendency to self-select students by ability and 
background through several other factors such as residential segregation, admission procedures, use 
of private sector and within-school ability tracking (Waldinger 2006). Unfortunately, large 
international student assessments do not contain information of student and school residential 
locations, hence good instruments for the school composition are not available especially for this 
type of schooling system. Information on admission procedures and within-school sorting by 
ability—included in the PISA dataset used in this work—allow to partially attenuate the estimation 
bias of the “school-composition effect”.  
    Using PISA-2006 dataset, the aim of this paper is to fill the existing gap in the literature on 
international comparison of educational systems by analysing how heterogeneity in the school 
environment, proxied by the standard deviation of the student backgrounds, affects both school 
efficiency and equity. In particular, starting from a widely accepted specification of the schooling 
production function (see Hanushek 1986, 2003; Fuchs and Woessmann 2007), the paper seeks to 
investigate whether the impact of school-composition variables changes in system with different 
tracking policies. To partially address the selectivity bias, as a first step we carry on regressions at 
the school-level in order to reduce unobservable student variability. Secondly, we move to student-
level regressions (i.e. controlling for individual and parental characteristics), where we include a 
school dummy for each quantile of the country distribution of the average parental background in 
order to attenuate the selectivity bias in estimating peer effects and the impact of peer heterogeneity. 
What we argue is that the comparison of individual- and school-level estimates represents a reliable 
                                                 
3Vanderberghe (2002), Rangvid (2007), Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer ( 2007), Entrof and Lauk (2006), 
Ammermueller and Pischke (2006). For the PIRLS survey, a reliable identification strategy of the peer effects is 
available as long as within-school variation can be exploited due to the detailed class-level information of the peer 
variables (see Ammermueller and Pischke 2006).  Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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way to identify the effect of peer heterogeneity on outcomes. Finally, the impact of peer 
heterogeneity and tracking policies on the equality of opportunity is assessed taking into account 
confounding factors such as the duration of pre-primary education and the share of private schools 
(see Schuetz  et al. 2008).   
Our empirical analysis strongly confirms that the impact of school-composition variables is 
strong, very significant and the single most important determinant of student performance. Unlike 
previous studies
4, often focussing on a single country, heterogeneity has a significant impact on 
student outcomes, but the patterns followed by countries with different age of tracking widely 
differ. On the one hand, peer heterogeneity by background reduces attainments in comprehensive 
schooling systems even if this result is largely driven by pupils attending vocationally-oriented 
programs. On the other hand, in early tracking systems, there exists an optimal degree of 
heterogeneity that maximizes attainments. Consistently with the theoretical literature (e.g. Brunello 
et al. 2007), linear peer effects are found to be stronger under the early-tracking regime. Besides, as 
expected, higher peer heterogeneity reduces the socio-economic gradient both in early and late 
tracking systems.  
    The paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly summarizes the literature to which our 
work is connected to and discusses the empirical strategy adopted. Section 3 describes the data and 
provides some preliminary evidence supporting our way of measuring background. In section 4 
(resp. 5), we present the results of school- (resp. student-) level regressions. Section 6 analyses the 
effect of heterogeneity on the socio-economic gradient, whereas section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Related literature and Empirical Strategy 
 
The observed weak correlation between the educational inputs and student outcomes 
represented the main puzzle for the literature attempting to explain the determinants of educational 
quality (Hanushek 2003). A simple principal-agent approach to educational production emphasizes 
the importance of the institutional design of the educational sector to explain this puzzle (Bishop 
and Woessmann 2004). In this framework, institutions enhancing school competition, autonomy 
and accountability are expected to increase the pressure towards higher standards, to enable the full 
exploitation of local knowledge regarding students’ characteristics and to reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour that would emerge in absence of appropriate monitoring practices 
(Woessmannn et al. 2010). Recent empirical studies using international assessment programs 
supported this view of educational production and highlighted possible complementarities among 
                                                 
4 See Hanushek et al. (2003), Zimmer and Toma (2000), Rangvid (2007), Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007). Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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different institutions; in particular, between the ones accountability practices and the degree of 
school autonomy (Woessmann 2003; Fuchs and Woessmann 2007; Woessmannn et al. 2010).  
Whereas at the empirical level these institutions seem to explain part of the missing correlation 
between resources and educational quality, background variables still represent the ones with the 
larger explanatory power in all works using international surveys (e.g. Fuchs and Woessmann 
2007). Hence, the puzzle of the missing resource-quality link can be explained from a theoretical 
perspective that explicitly includes school-composition variables as inputs of educational 
production (De Bartolome 1992, Benabou 1996, Fernandez and Rogerson 1996). The learning 
environment can not, in fact, be reduced to a vector of school characteristics as long as the abilities 
and the home background of school- and class-mates determine the learning standards for the class 
as a whole together with the out-of-school social context.  
From a theoretical standpoint, the influence of class heterogeneity on student outcomes is 
ambiguous as forces going in opposite directions tend to offset each other. On the one hand, having 
more homogeneous classes implies similar cognitive levels and the sharing of common behavioural 
codes, so less teaching efforts devoted to equalize students skills. On the other hand, in 
heterogeneous classes various types of externalities might arise: disruptive due to the presence of 
students with a particular bad attitude (Laezar 2001), or positive knowledge spillovers from good 
students to average and/or bad ones (e.g. Durlauf 2004). Which one tends to prevail depends on the 
shape of the educational production function. More precisely, if school-composition effects enter 
linearly in the educational production function, efficiency is unaffected by the reallocation of 
students to schools and classes; the opposite occurs in the non-linear case (Benabou 1996). These 
considerations have relevant policy implications as long as the matching process of students to 
schools might depend in a substantial way from factors beyond the sphere of educational policies. 
For instance, the “rich” can successfully isolate themselves by approving residential restrictions to 
school admission. More in general, the assignment of students to schools that maximizes aggregate 
human capital is very unlikely to emerge as a market outcome because several structural constraints 
shape schooling choices: admission procedures, physical distance, early tracking policies, within-
school ability tracking, etc. (e.g. de Bartolome 1992).   
Recent theoretical and empirical contributions underlie the role of early tracking policies in 
affecting schooling decisions of individuals from different backgrounds (Epple and Romano 2002; 
Dustnmann 2004; Brunello et al. 2007). Because parental influence matters more at the beginning 
of the student life, an earlier streaming increases the probability that students from worse 
backgrounds end up in the vocational streaming, which offers less promising learning perspectives 
in terms of teacher quality, resources invested and course content. On the other hand, students from Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
 
  7
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds that decide to be enrolled in a gymnasium are likely to 
be more motivated and/or particularly able. Finally, educational systems with an early tracking age 
often puts vocational and specific training at the centre of their development strategy (Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Krueger and Kumar 2004), hence vocational schools might attract also students with 
background above the average. With these premises in mind, one would expect that heterogeneity in 
unobservable student characteristics within the school ends up being substantially lower in early 
tracking systems with respect to comprehensive ones. Thus, the effect of peers’ heterogeneity on 
student outcomes should vary in systems with different tracking policies (Brunello et al. 2007) and 
empirical assessments are required to quantify this difference. To the best of our knowledge, 
existing empirical works do not assess whether the impact of peer heterogeneity on student 
attainments varies in schooling system with different tracking policies. This represents a main 
contribution of the present work. 
Not only student outcomes, but also the distribution of educational opportunities depends on 
peer heterogeneity and early tracking policies. Theoretical works predict that highly segregated 
schools and an earlier streaming age both widen educational opportunities (e.g. Brunello et al. 
2007). The latter effect is well documented in the empirical literature (e.g. Ammermueller 2005; 
Hanushek and Woessmann 2006; Schuetz et el. 2008), although more recent works using 
difference-in-difference estimation at the individual level, or more reliable measures of tracking, 
seem to discard the hypothesis that an earlier tracking age increases the inequality of opportunities 
(Waldinger 2006; Brunello and Checchi 2007). The former effect is less analysed using a direct 
measure of peer heterogeneity as we do here. However, a positive and significant peer effect 
mechanically leads to levelling opportunities. Still, it is not clear whether the levelling of 
educational outcomes is stronger for low ability students, as it appeared in earlier works (Zimmer 
and Toma 2000; Vandenberghe 2002; Hanushek et al. 2003; Rangvid 2007; Schneeweiss and 
Winter-Ebmer 2007), or from high to average ability students, as more recent researches for the UK 
have demonstrated (Gibbons and Telhaj 2008; Lavy et al. 2009).   
This paper is related to the literature on peer effects using large international assessment 
surveys. The more rigorous attempt to identify peer effects in this literature is the paper 
Ammermueller and Pischke (2006). Similarly to Hoxby (2000), Hanushek et al. (2003), McEvan 
(2003), they use within-school variations in the class composition to solve the identification 
problem associated to a non-random student assignment. Under the assumption that the within-
school allocation of student and resources is random, all the distortions due to non-random 
assignment are associated to variations between-schools. Hence, class variations in the peer 
composition within the school enable to disentangle the pure peer effect from an endogenous school Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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selectivity bias. Using the PIRLS dataset, they found modestly large peer effects even when 
controlling for measurement errors. Moreover, accounting for the selection bias only slightly 
reduces the peer effect obtained in a standard OLS specification. 
Unfortunately, a similar identification strategy is not available in the PISA survey that does not 
provide detailed classroom information. Conversely, for the scope of this paper, the main advantage 
of the PISA dataset is that it allows to uncover cross-country variations in tracking policies and 
offers information on several policies affecting the school composition, i.e. admission procedures, 
ability grouping.  
In the few papers attempting to assess peer effects using PISA, the identification strategy has 
been based upon the claim that the omitted variable bias is the most important source of selectivity 
problems. Therefore, the selectivity problem is reduced by having a large set of controls, both at 
school- and at individual-level, which are likely to affect the assignment of students to schools 
(Rangvid 2007; Schneeweiss and Winter-Ebmer 2007). For instance, Rangvid (2007) measures peer 
quality with the average education of the mother and uses variables of parental care, encouragement 
and time spend with their children to reduce the omitted variable bias. By using quantile regressions 
techniques, she conditions the effect of peers to the ability distribution and found stronger peer 
effects for low ability students in Denmark. In turn, a higher heterogeneity has an insignificant 
impact on student achievement along the entire distribution of test scores. Schneeweiss and Winter-
Ebmer (2007) found a similar differential impact of peer quality along the ability distribution for 
Austria, whereas background heterogeneity appears to have a slightly negative and significant effect 
on outcomes. In a paper with a logic similar to our but with a different focus, Entrof and Lauer 
(2006) attempts to distinguish the peer effect of immigrants and natives in different tracking 
systems and found stronger peer effects in countries with an earlier tracking. Another possibility, 
followed by Fertig (2003), lies in instrumenting peer heterogeneity with proxies of the caring 
behaviour of parents at home and of admission procedures. For the U.S., he found a strongly 
negative effect of heterogeneity, measured with the coefficient of variation in the achievement of 
schoolmates, on performance in reading. However, both the measure of schooling heterogeneity—
the coefficient of variation—and the instruments chosen appear rather weak. In particular, the 
coefficient of variation is such that a lower mean in the test leads to an increase in the coefficient of 
variation. As a result, since a lower mean of the schoolmates negatively affects the final outcome, 
this impact appears the mechanical consequence of a higher heterogeneity rather than the one of a 
lower mean
5. An opposite, negative and significant effect of class heterogeneity—measured with 
                                                 
5Moreover, the instruments used become not anymore valid if one includes other contextual variables such as the share 
of parents working in the peer group. More in general, it seems difficult to find convincing instruments in cross-
sectional regressions without having information on the characteristics of the neighbourhood of residence. Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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the standard deviation of a composite index of family background—on student attainments is found 
by Vandenberghe (2002) in a cross-country study using the TIMMS dataset. However, he 
introduces several non-linear terms in the class composition variables that makes the effect of 
heterogeneity difficult to isolate. 
    Using the international student assessment PISA 2006, the purpose of this paper is to estimate the 
impact of school-composition variables, in particular of peer heterogeneity, on efficiency and 
equity, and how this impact varies in systems with different tracking policies; hence we are 
implicitly testing the validity of a linear and of a “pooled” specification of the peer influence. In 
order to minimize biases in the estimates of school-composition variables, the core of our empirical 
strategy is to compare school- and student-level regressions adding several controls that are 
correlated with the sorting of individuals to schools of different quality, i.e. admission procedures, 
dummies for school competition, ability grouping. What we claim is that the impact of 
heterogeneity should be correctly identified if once moving from school to individual estimates, the 
sign, the size and the significance of the coefficient of peer heterogeneity remain substantially 
unchanged.  The further advantage of school-level regressions is to attenuate the bias associated to 
unobservable individual characteristics; at least under the plausible assumption that the mean of 
these unobservable characteristics – i.e. the average individual selected by the school – are fully 
captured by compositional variables (e.g. share of immigrants) and certain schooling characteristics 
(e.g. school type or admission procedure). This advantage should be balanced against the cost that 
in school-level regressions linear peer effects are indistinguishable from the average background 
effect. 
In student-level regressions, we perform several robust checks with the purpose of improving 
the reliability of the estimated impact of heterogeneity and, at the same time, to adopt updated 
empirical strategies to reduce the bias in the estimation of linear peer effects. In particular, as in 
Ammermueller and Pischke (2006), we use school level dummies in order to attenuate the 
selectivity bias. Recall that this strategy is valid under the assumption that the correlation between 
school and individual unobservable characteristics is mainly dependent on school characteristics. 
According to Ammermueller and Pischke (2006), this necessary condition for identification is less 
likely to be satisfied in secondary schools where within-school sorting by ability matters, especially 
in certain countries. Here, controlling for within-school ability tracking enables us to mitigate this 
“confounding effect” (while, due to data limitations, we are not able to identify classroom peer 
effects)
 6.  
                                                 
6 PISA surveys do not allow to estimate classroom peer effects. Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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To be more precise, consider the following specification of the schooling production function 
that is basically the one proposed by Fuchs and Woessmann (2007) extended to include school 
composition variables: 
 
(eq.1),    ) ( isc is i c s i s s s i c s i isc u u u u u BACK Var BACK X BACK X X X A + + + + + + + + + + + + = σ μ υ γ δ χ β α
 
where, for sake of space, we do not write down imputation dummies for missing variables (see 
section 5). The student achievement A in school s and country c is the resultant of a vector of 
individual ( i X ), school ( s X ), country ( c X ) controls plus individual background ( i BACK ) and 
school compositional factors in terms of students’ background ( s BACK  and  ) ( i s BACK Var ) and 
other characteristics ( s X ), such as gender, immigrant status, etc. The error is decomposed here in a 
country effect uc, an individual effect ui, a school effect us and a correlated school-individual 
effect  uis plus the standard independent error term uisc. The school-individual interaction and the 
individual effect are the ones that are likely to be correlated with both the school composition 
variables and to the student achievement. This is because individuals are selected by schools upon 
certain unobservable variables and procedures. By schools, eq.1 becomes: 
 
() (eq.2).            ) ( ) ( isc s c s s c s s sc u u u BACK Var BACK X X X A + + + + + + + + + + = σ μ γ δ χ β υ α  
 
Under the plausible assumption that the average unobservable individual characteristics boils down 
onto the school-composition variables and school characteristics, the impact of heterogeneity is 
correctly identified using “school-level clustering-robust” linear regressions. At the individual level, 
instead, the way of reducing the selectivity problem rests on the assumption that individual and 
correlated school-individual effects are fully captured by observable and unobservable schooling 
characteristics. Unobservable schooling characteristics are proxied including both other socio-
demographic school-composition variables (e.g. the share of immigrants and of females), and a 
dummy equal 1 for the quantile of the country-specific distribution of the average parental 
background at which the school belongs to. Hence we estimate the following function: 
 
), (eq.1'        ) ( isc s c i s s s i c s i sc isc u u u BACK Var BACK X BACK X X X A + + + + + + + + + + = σ μ υ γ δ χ β α
 
where  s X  and  s BACK  are now the schoolmates composition net of individual and αsc is the 
school quantile fixed effect. Equation 1’ leads to unbiased estimates of both the linear and the Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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heterogeneous peer effect if the correlated and the idiosyncratic individual term are fully absorbed 
in the new covariates. Throughout the paper, the fact that equation 1’ is often estimated separated 
by the type of tracking policy (see below) and always using standard errors clustered by school 
further reduces the endogeneity bias especially in countries that track students earlier—where the 
within-school variation in the unobservable individual characteristics is expected to be lower. 
Concerning the estimation of the effect of heterogeneity and tracking on equity, we follow the 
specification of Schuetz et al. (2008) and Brunello and Checchi (2007) where a full set of 
interaction dummies between a measure of background and several factors that might affect the size 
of the socio-economic gradient are included. Among these factors, we add heterogeneity in 
background in a reduced-form model where school characteristics are excluded since, differently 
from estimation of the standard production function, the impact of student background on 
performance should be depurated by any effect that might act through families’ differential access 
to schools of different quality (Schuetz et al. 2008). In section 6 we estimate the following 
relationship: 
 
(eq.3).        )) * ( )) ( * ( ) * (
... ) * (
isc s i i s i i c
i c i i isc
u BACK BACK BACK Var BACK BACK T
BACK X BACK X A
+ + + +
+ + + + =
λ ϕ ϑ
η γ β α
 
 
The first interactions are between the factors – i.e. duration of pre-primary school, share of public 
schools, student/teacher ratio – that might disturb the relationship between background and or 
variables of interest—i.e. tracking and school compositional variables—which are captured by the 
other interaction terms. Next section briefly describes the PISA dataset and provides a descriptive 
glance of the different impact of heterogeneity in countries with different tracking policies.  
 
3.  Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis. 
 
In the empirical analysis, we use the 2006 PISA survey that so far has not been used yet to 
assess the impact of school-composition variables on student outcomes. PISA’s target population is 
15-year-old students in each country, regardless of the grade they currently attend. Differently from 
other internationally comparable surveys such as  PIRLS and TIMMS programs, the PISA dataset 
presents the additional desirable feature of being more oriented on problem solving capacities 
(know-how) rather than on curricula skill (know-what). PISA dataset contains detailed information 
on student’s home background, school resources and a wide range of institutional variables 
capturing the degree of school autonomy, accountability practices and variables affecting the Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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student choice (Woessmann et al. 2010). Individual controls such as sex, age, grade, etc. are also 
available, whereas policy variables at the national level are usually integrated by other dataset 
(Oecd, UNESCO, etc.). Since PISA 2006 is focussed on science, we consider only the outcome in 
science as the dependent variable.  
Some variables used in the econometric analysis of next sections are indexes built by PISA 
experts in order to summarize various school or individual characteristics related to each other. For 
instance, the degree of autonomy in managing resources at the school level is captured either by a 
vector of dummies (autonomy in within-school allocation, in hiring and firing teacher, etc.) that are 
highly dependent to each other or by a synthetic indicator built upon these dummies (see table A1 
for details). The same holds for indexes of school resources and background
7. Of particular interest 
for our work is the variable of background built by the Oecd—called the Economic Social Cultural 
Status “escs”—which combines information provided by widely used measures of parental 
background: highest parental years of education, the highest occupational level quantified with the 
index of occupational status (Ganzeboom et al. 1992), the number of books at home and the 
resources available at home to study, i.e. “homepos”. The “escs” variable is chosen here as our 
baseline measure of background since it encompasses in a synthetic way the various and 
multidimensional aspects shaping the impact of family characteristics on the student’s attainment.   
    Table 1 displays by countries the descriptive statistics of the main variables on which we focus 
on to explain student performance in science: age and grade of first tracking, mean results in 
science and mean and standard deviation of family background indexes, etc. (for a full description 
of the variables used see table A1 in the appendix). Table 2 shows the degree of correlation between 
the composite “escs”  index and each of its components, which follows by the construction. 
However, a much lower correlation with the variable books-at-home suggests to include such 
variable together with either “escs” index (or its components) as controls of individual background 
in the empirical specification.  
A key issue for our paper is to find a reliable measure of peer effects and of heterogeneity in 
backgrounds at the school level. As standard in the literature, the average level of the “escs”, net of 
the individual one, is our favourite measure of the linear peer effect, whereas – similarly to Rangvid 
(2007) – the standard deviation of the “escs” account for peer heterogeneity. Moreover, in order to 
partially account for cross-country differences in the allocation process of students of different 
background to schools of different quality, we normalize the standard deviation at the school level 
                                                 
7 See OECD 2009 and the PISA 2006 Technical Report for a detailed explanation about how these indexes have been 
computed. Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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with the one at the country level
8. In fact, a high heterogeneity at the school level can be due to a 
high heterogeneity in the country rather than to a random sorting of students to schools, hence the 
desired level of heterogeneity at the school level is bounded by the overall background 
heterogeneity at the country level.   
A first look to the data is useful to ground on more solid bases the following empirical analysis. 
Simple scatter plots adjusted for school weights highlight a pronounced non-linearity in the 
relationship between peer heterogeneity and performance resulting as the balance of the positive 
and negative externalities triggered by the interaction of individuals from different backgrounds 
(figure 1). However, as it appears clear from figure 2 and table 3, this relationship is largely driven 
by countries tracking students earlier. In turn, in comprehensive systems, higher heterogeneity 
negatively influences outcomes along the entire school distribution (figure 2). Since background 
variables are highly correlated with test outcomes, figure 3 suggests that this pattern is somehow 
driven by the one between the mean and the variance of the “escs” at the school level. A further 
comparison of the two school systems in table 4 (e.g. rows 4-8) shows that differences in the school 
composition by background are not as large as one would expect. What substantially differs 
between the two groups of countries is the quota of persons doing vocational programs 
(significantly higher in the early tracking system), the sorting within school by ability (significantly 
higher in comprehensive systems) and the admission procedures (relatively more based on student 
records and residence in comprehensive systems). Besides, the two systems seem to have a different 
degree of school dispersion in terms of unobservable individual characteristics: between-school 
variance in the average attainments is much larger in the early tracking with respect to the 
comprehensive systems (table 4, lines 1-2). This evidence seems to suggest that differences in 
tracking age mainly translate into differences in sorting by unobservable. 
By and large, the descriptive analysis presented here confirms that different patterns emerge 
between countries with or without an early student tracking. This evidence motivates the inclusion 
of a non-linear specification of the effect of heterogeneity on outcomes. In the pooled specification, 
this is obtained with an interaction dummy between heterogeneity and early tracking. In the 
separated regressions, the square of the standard deviation is also included to account for non-linear 
effects of heterogeneity. Next sections present the results. 
 
4.  School-level regressions 
 
                                                 
8 However, all results are robust to the inclusion of the ‘no-normalized’ standard deviation of backgrounds at the school 
level. Results using this further measure of heterogeneity are available upon request by the authors. Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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The sample of countries used in this paper consists in OECD ones but France where school 
variables have not been recorded in the PISA 2006 survey. As in Woessmann et al. (2010), Mexico 
and Turkey are excluded because they have an average “escs” that is a full standard deviation below 
the OECD average. Also following many studies using PISA surveys, we excluded from the sample 
those very few students enrolled in grades lower than 8 or higher than 11. Finally, as we intend to 
analyze the effect of social interactions at school, we restricted the sample to students attending 
schools for which PISA 2006 provided data for at least 15 students, i.e. we dropped schools with 
less than 15 interviewed students
9. Our final sample includes 202.817 students clustered in 6.728 
schools.  
As discussed in section 2, the first stage of our analysis focuses on regressions at the schooling 
level in order to reduce unobservable student variability. Several control variables identified at 
school level are included. The first type of controls are compositional variables that proxy certain 
basic features of the demographic, social and cultural environment at school: the mean students’ age 
and the share of females, of immigrants, of students speaking a foreign language at home and of 
students enrolled in a vocational programme (see table A1). In turn, as stated before, the average 
student index “escs” and its standard deviation at the school-level (normalized by the country 
standard deviation) are our measures of linear peer and of school-mates heterogeneity respectively.   
As further control variables we added a set of variables concerning school resources and 
institutions, class size, school location and country-level controls (see table A1). Among country 
controls, we included institutional variables that are provided to be important determinants of 
student attainments (Fuchs and Woessmann 2007); in particular, the share of students subjected to 
external evaluation and/or standard test in science, the age of tracking between different kinds of 
programmes (general or vocational, OECD educational dataset) and the quota of pupils attending 
pre-primary education (UNESCO educational dataset).  
Among school-level institutional variables, we included quantitative PISA indexes concerning 
school responsibility for allocating resources and for curriculum and assessment
10, school-type 
dummies (built crossing information on school management and the main source of founding) and 
two dummies for the admission procedures followed by the school (i.e. signalling if residence or 
students’ ability are a high priority or a prerequisite for being enrolled in that school). The latter 
                                                 
9 Note that the same sample restriction for similar purposes has been applied in Rangvid (2007). 
10 Among controls about school institutions, in all regressions shown in this paper, we included the ‘respres’ and 
‘respcurr’ indexes (see table A1 and OECD 2009) instead of the dummies about the single components of school 
autonomy and responsibility about resources and curricula, due to the several missing values characterizing each 
dummy. Replacing these dummies with the two OECD indexes, which by construction have much less missing values, 
does not alter our results. Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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dummies seem particularly well suited in order to reduce the selectivity bias due to a non-random 
assignment of students to schools.  
In table 5, we show the results of school-level regressions on science performance for the pooled 
sample of countries. For sake of space, in what follows we present estimated coefficients for the 
variables of interest, i.e. average and standard dev. of “escs”. Results available upon request show 
that, in both regressions at school- and at student-level (see section 5), other variables display the 
expected signs and significance consistently with the empirical literature on students’ performances 
using international assessment programmes (see Fuchs and Woessmann 2007; Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2010), in particular school resources seem to exert a lower influence than school and 
country institutional features.  
Model SC-1 in table 5 highlights the large positive effect played by the average parental 
background; in fact, a change in one standard deviation of the “escs” index turns out to explain 41 
out of the 100 points of the standard deviation in the student attainments. This is not surprisingly as 
long as, in school-level regressions, the average “escs” identifies both the peer and the individual 
parental background effect, which has been found to be the larger explanatory factor of student 
outcomes (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann 2010). Unlike linear peer effects, the impact of 
heterogeneity is correctly identified in school-level regressions under the plausible assumption that 
the average unobservable individual characteristics boils down onto the school composition 
variables and school characteristics. Background heterogeneity exerts a negative and significant 
impact on the average performance, even if the magnitude of this impact is rather small: a one 
standard deviation increase in the degree of heterogeneity leads to a 1.8 point decrease in the 
average science score (see model SC-2, table 5). This result in favour of segregation appears 
nuanced when we allow for non-linear effects of heterogeneity. The inclusion of the “escs” 
variance, so as suggested by the preliminary analysis in section 3, makes the relationship between 
heterogeneity and performance inversely U-shaped, being now positive and significant the linear 
term while the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative and significant (see model SC-3 table 5).  
In models so far discussed we included, as controls of the link between school composition and 
performances, variables recording resources and institutional aspects at the school-level. However, 
educational inputs is likely to be related to student background; hence estimates of background 
variables can be plagued by endogeneity since pupils from better families attain schools with more 
resources and better institutions. Since this source of endogeneity stems from a more or less 
distributed allocation of resources and institutions within the country, aggregating school-level 
resources and institutional characteristics at the country-level allows circumventing these 
endogeneity problems, then providing unbiased estimates (see Woessmann 2003). Accordingly, the Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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robustness of model SC-3 can be checked replacing school resources and institutional variables 
with their country average
11, which largely confirms previous results (see SC-4, table 5). 
Interestingly, with respect to model SC-3 the estimated joint impact of background and peer 
increases by only 1.9 points of a full standard deviation in the PISA score suggesting that the 
distortion induced by this source of endogeneity is negligible. 
Consistently with the focus of the paper and with the preliminary analysis of section 3, the next 
step is to consider the joint influence of tracking and peer heterogeneity on achievements. Recall 
that tracking can occur within-school or between different types of schools. The former is based on 
ability grouping and prevails in Anglo-Saxon countries; the latter implies the streaming into 
completely different segments of the education process, generally offering general or vocational 
programmes such as in Germany and in many central European countries (Brunello and Checchi, 
2007). Here we mainly focus on schooling tracking
12 to split countries according to the age when 
students have to choose between programs
13.  
A first way to differentiate the effect of heterogeneity by tracking systems is to introduce an 
interaction term between peer heterogeneity and a dummy classifying OECD countries into early or 
late tracking ones. In this case, the negative impact and the significance of the “escs” standard 
deviation increases, but at the same time the fact that the interaction term between the “escs” 
standard deviation and the early tracking dummy is positive and significant highlights the 
differential impact of heterogeneity on student outcomes in countries tracking students before the 
age of 13 (model SC-5, table 5).  
As a next step in order to better assess differences between the early-tracking and the 
comprehensive system, we run school-level regressions separated by the two groups of countries 
(table 6). Replicating model SC-2 for each group of countries it is possible to better disentangle the 
large difference in the impact of peer heterogeneity between early tracking and comprehensive 
systems. On the one hand, in countries tracking students after the age of 13, heterogeneity exerts a 
negative influence on student outcomes. On the other hand, the sign reverts in early tracking 
countries, but the positive effect is significant only at the cut-off level of 85%. Note that the 
opposite influence of peer heterogeneity in different tracking systems is confirmed even when we 
                                                 
11 Woessmann et al. (2010) show the robustness of considering country averages based on PISA instead of data 
provided by other data sources. In model SC-4 also the share of students enrolled in vocational courses is considered as 
a country average. 
12 However, to account for within-school tracking, in model SC-7 in table 6, we will also  control for information on 
ability grouping within the school. 
13 Literature provides several measures of tracking systems: Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) uses the age of the first 
tracking choice, Ammermueller (2005) the number of tracks experienced by the student before enrolling in upper 
secondary education, Waldinger (2006) the minimum school grade where a significant share of students is allocated in 
different tracks. In model SC-5, in line with the Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), we consider as early-trackers 
countries where students have to choose before they are 13 years old. Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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split countries following the method proposed by Waldinger (2006), as shown in table 6 by model 
SC-2A. Finally, the size of the impact of heterogeneity on student outcomes increases when 
separated regressions are carried on with the impact of a one standard deviation increase ranging 
from +2.0 (resp. -4.1) to +2.4 (resp. -4.3) change in students’ attainments in the early tracking (resp. 
comprehensive) system.     
When including also non-linear effect of peer heterogeneity, differences between the two groups 
widen. In comprehensive systems both the linear and the quadratic term become not significant, 
whereas in early-tracking ones both terms appear highly significant, showing an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between background heterogeneity and the average performance (model SC-3, table 6). 
Moreover, this relationship remains robust either to the inclusion of country fixed effects (model 
SC-6, table 6) or – although at a much lower significance level – when country averages instead of 
school-level resources and institutional variables are considered (model SC-4, table 6)
14. It is worth 
noticing that, calibrating with the coefficients estimated in table 2, the optimal degree of 
heterogeneity that maximizes attainments in early-tracking systems is located near to the median 
level of the “escs” standard deviation. 
Finally, in order to account for across countries differences in ability tracking within the school 
(a widely used policy particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries), we run another model (SC-7, table 6) 
with additional school-level dummies capturing the procedures followed within the school for 
grouping students by ability and also, following Woessmann et al. (2010), accountability practices 
internal to the school (see table A1). The inclusion of these additional controls, which in principle 
should distort the impact of heterogeneity, reinforces our results in so far as the positive influence 
of peer heterogeneity in early tracking systems becomes stronger and more significant. 
As stated in previous sections, the main advantage of school-level regressions presented so far is 
that they allow to attenuate the bias associated to unobservable individual characteristics. This 
advantage should be balanced against the cost that in school-level regressions linear peer effects are 
indistinguishable from the background effect. With the aim of identifying also this effect, we now 
move to student-level estimations.  
 
5.  Student-level regressions 
 
 
Pooled student-level regressions lead to a substantial increase in the number of observations and 
hence allow controlling for several additional factors. First of all, when running regressions using 
                                                 
14 These differences between early and late tracking countries emerge also when proxies of peer heterogeneity based on 
different parental background variables are computed (e.g. highest parental occupational status and educational 
attainment). Detailed results are available upon request by the authors.  Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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students as the unity of observations individual characteristics (age, sex, grade etc…) are included 
(see table A1).  Second, the multifaceted and complex mechanisms that drive the transmission of 
parental characteristics to children can be considered by unpacking the individual background effect 
into the several components of the “escs” index: the highest parental education (in years) and 
occupational status, the OECD variable summarising in a quantitative index the family “home 
possessions” (OECD 2009), dummies capturing the “number of books at home”. Thirdly, compared 
to school-level regressions, “peer composition” variables are net of the individual ones and are 
based on six students’ characteristics: sex, age, immigrant and “foreign language” status, type of 
school programme (general or vocational) and the “escs” index. Finally, in an extended model, we 
also include additional controls proxying the effort devoted in studying science (see table A1). 
Student-level regressions might lead to biased estimates in so far as missing values on certain 
individual characteristics are not randomly distributed, but turn out to be related to background and 
ability. As a result, dropping students with missing information for some variables could engender a 
sample selection bias. In order to copy with this issue, we impute individual missing values 
regarding family background (escs, pared, hisei and homepos variables, see table A1) and some 
individual characteristics (immigrant and foreign language) according to the usual methodology 
followed in the literature (Woessmann 2004). Thereafter, we regress each variable subjected to the 
imputation procedure on basic controls available for nearly all students (age, sex, grade, dummies 
“vocational” and “isced 3”, two country-level controls – GDP and expenditure on education per 
capita – and the number of books at home) and replace missing values with predicted ones. Once 
having replaced missing values with imputed ones, in all student-level regressions carried on we 
correct for the measurement error that could arise due to the imputation procedure by allowing the 
observations with missing data on each variable to have their own intercepts and slopes 
(Woessmann 2004)
15. As an additional methodological caveat, the “school-level clustering-robust” 
linear regression method is always used in student-level regressions to estimate standard errors that 
recognize the schools as the basic unit of sampling in the survey (Woessmann 2004).  
Table 7 shows OLS estimations for the pooled sample of OECD countries
16. With respect to 
school-level estimates, the impact of heterogeneity is also negative but at a significant level around 
the cut-off level of 15% (ST-1, table 7), whereas it is not significant at all when non-linear effects 
are included (ST-2 and ST-3, table 7). The size of the heterogeneity effect only slightly decreases 
                                                 
15 In particular, we include a dummy that takes the value 1 for an imputed data and 0 for observations with original data 
and an interaction term between this imputation dummy and the respective variable subjected to the imputation 
procedure 
16 To obtain representative coefficient estimates from the stratified survey data – as in section 4, where regressions were 
ran using schools’ sample weights provided in the PISA dataset, students’ sample weights are used in all estimations of 
sections 5-6. Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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from around 1.9 to around 1.3 points of a full standard deviation in the test scores. In turn, linear 
peer effects are significant and very large with a change in one standard deviation of the “escs” 
accounting for more than a 20% change in the standard deviation of the science test (ST-1, table7). 
Whereas the first result is somehow in line with the one of the previous literature finding small (but 
insignificant!) effects of heterogeneity on student performance (e.g. Hanushek et al. 2003; Rangvid 
2007), the estimated impact of the linear peer effect is larger than the bulk ones founded in the 
literature (see Ammermueller and Pischke 2006). However, when we adopt a more precise 
identification strategy to isolate the linear peer effect (see §2 and ST-0, table 7; i.e. including school 
fixed effects and school- and student-level additional controls and excluding heterogeneity terms), 
the estimated effect decreases up to around 18%, closer to the impact found by other studies using 
PISA surveys (e.g. Rangvid 2007; Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer 2007).  
Note that the R
2 reduces compared to the very high level (around 60%) shown in school-level 
regressions. This is expected since a large part of the performance variation across students has to 
be attributed to unobserved variables (e.g. their innate ability or learning motivation). However, its 
level, around 34%, is in line with the one of the two studies using a large set of controls to reduce 
the omitted variable bias in the estimation of peer effects (Rangvid 2007; Schneeweis and Winter-
Ebmer 2007). 
As in school-level analysis, the picture substantially changes when the interaction between the 
heterogeneity and the tracking system is added (model ST-4, table 7). Again, this interaction is 
positive and significant suggesting that in early-tracking countries heterogeneity can foster students’ 
performances, even once controlling for other school composition aspects. School-level results are 
also confirmed in separate regressions with a higher heterogeneity being significant with opposite 
signs in systems with early-tracking (+) and comprehensive (-) schools (ST-1, table8).  Looking at 
table 7, results remain robust to different classifications of the countries by tracking (ST-1A) and to 
the inclusion of country fixed effects (ST-6). Moreover, the difference between the two tracking 
systems is further more evident when the quadratic heterogeneity term is also included (model ST-
5): with respect to school regressions both the inverted U-shaped relationship – again increasing up 
to median level of the “escs” standard deviation – for early-tracking countries and the insignificance 
of the polynomial function for comprehensive ones are confirmed at the student-level. It has to be 
emphasized that moving from school- to student-level regressions estimated signs and sizes of the 
heterogeneity terms remains the same, hence the impact of heterogeneity should be correctly 
identified. Finally, consistently with the theoretical literature (e.g. Brunello et al. 2007) and with 
Entrof and Lauer (2006) – but with a focus on the effect of immigrant peers – separate regressions 
display a larger (linear) peer effect in early tracking systems (table 8).   Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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Interestingly, in comprehensive school systems, the interaction term between heterogeneity and 
the country-level share of students enrolled in vocational programs displays a highly negative and 
significant coefficient suggesting that the negative impact of heterogeneity on student performance 
is largely driven by schools offering vocational programs (model ST-5, table 8). In contrast, in 
early-tracking ones, the relationship between heterogeneity and performances is not driven by the 
share of students enrolled in vocational programmes. All in all, this finding has a strong policy 
implication in so far as, also in comprehensive systems, the impact of higher background 
heterogeneity appears to be negative only in a minority of schools oriented towards training
17.   
Adding further school and student controls (i.e. admission procedures, school accountability and 
proxies of individual efforts, see table A1) corrects for the omitted variable bias in the estimation of 
school composition variables. In this case, the significance of the two opposite effects of the “escs 
standard deviation” slightly decreases but still emerges, whereas, as expected, the impact of the 
linear peer effect is mitigated (model ST-7, table 9).  
However, correcting for the omitted variable bias might not be sufficient to attenuate the 
selectivity bias in the estimation of peer effects if unobservable schooling characteristics are still 
present (see section 3). In order to attempt a better identification of the linear peer effect, following 
Ammermueller and Pischke (2006)
18 and according to the empirical strategy described in section 2, 
we add school-level fixed effects, identified, for each country, by the quantile of the average 
parental “escs” distribution to which the school belongs to (models ST-8 – ST-9, table 9). The linear 
peer effect reduces in size but only in countries tracking earlier, whereas its size remains unchanged 
in countries with comprehensive school. This implies that the identification strategy of linear peer 
effect suggested by Ammermueller and Pischke (2006) is particularly suitable for early-tracking 
systems where the early selection process might create more homogeneous but “less observable” 
school types. 
Concerning the impact of heterogeneity, in comprehensive systems a strong difference emerges 
comparing models ST-1, ST-7 and ST-8 (tables 8 and 9); indeed, when variables about students’ 
time of work and school sorting are added, the significance of the negative heterogeneity effect 
strongly reduces and it disappears when school fixed effects are included too. In turn, in the most 
complete model (ST-9) where both types of additional controls and the quadratic heterogeneity term 
are included, the inverted U-shaped relationship between heterogeneity and student’s competences 
in science is confirmed for early-tracking countries. 
                                                 
17 However, the share of students enrolled in vocational programs is zero in several countries considered, hence this 
result is difficult to interpret. Using the share of students enrolled in schools that mainly offer training, a higher share of 
students attending schools which offer training also leads to a significantly negative effect of heterogeneity in 
comprehensive systems. Further details are available upon request by the authors.  
18 Also Schneeweiss and Winter-Ebmer (2007) include a school fixed effect in their analysis of peer effects in Austria. Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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   So far, using OLS techniques, we have focused on average peer and heterogeneity effects. This 
standard methodology may neglect how school composition affects achievements differently at 
different points of the conditional test score distribution and hence might lead to misleading policy 
implications. For instance, while the effect of peer heterogeneity may not be significant for average 
test scores, it is useful to know whether this effect is also not significant for all quantiles of the 
conditional test score distribution (Rangvid 2007). 
In order to answer this question, we use quantile regressions to estimate model ST-1 separated 
for early and late tracking countries. Quantile regressions confirm that the linear peer effect is 
positive all along the conditional test score distribution and remarkably higher in early tracking 
countries (figure 4 and table 10). Moreover, consistently with previous studies limited to Austria 
(Schneeweiss and Winter-Ebmer 2007) and Denmark (Rangvid 2007), it is slightly larger in lower 
deciles. As expected, main differences between the two groups of countries emerges with respect to 
the influence of peer heterogeneity (figure 5 and table 10). In all deciles, the “escs” standard 
deviation is always statistical significant at the 99% level. However, its sign is largely positive and 
slightly U-shaped along the entire test score distribution in early tracking systems, while it remains 
always negative in comprehensive systems where the size of the negative effect is only slightly 
lower in upper deciles. 
In sum, quantile regressions reinforce the previous finding in terms of a small efficiency-
enhancing effect of mixing students in early tracking systems, where individuals are probably more 
homogeneous in their unobservable features. Conversely, the picture in comprehensive systems is 
nuanced: on the one hand, stronger peer effects at the bottom of the ability distribution would lead 
to support policies aimed at increasing background heterogeneity
19; on the other hand, a too high 
heterogeneity turns out to offset the efficiency-enhancing effect of mixing background. For policy 
purposes, the effect of school-composition variables on efficiency should be seen together with the 
one on equity; this is the objective of next section. 
 
6.  Peer heterogeneity and equality of opportunity 
 
 
In this section, our focus moves to the effect of peer heterogeneity on equalizing the attainments 
of students from different backgrounds; in particular, we want to analyse the extent to which the 
                                                 
19 However, a caveat is required here. The effect of regrouping students by background should be balanced against the 
associated regrouping of students by ability. It might be that the regrouping would bring about peer effects due to 
interactions of individuals of different abilities that offset or amplify the ones due to the interactions of individuals from 
different backgrounds. Since we can not disentangle ability peer effect from background ones, policy implications are 
less clear cut.  Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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theoretical prediction that a heterogeneous school environment tends to level opportunities of pupils 
from different backgrounds (e.g. Benabou 1996) is empirically warranted. A way to answer this 
question empirically consists in assessing whether the family background effect, i.e.  the link 
between individual performances and family background, is linked to peers’ average and 
heterogeneity. 
 The existing literature (Woessmann 2007; Schuetz et al. 2008; Brunello and Checchi 2007) 
interprets the coefficient of a synthetic variable of parental background as a proper measure of 
inequality of educational opportunities using a parsimonious, reduced-form specification of the 
determinants of student performance (see section 2). Following this literature, we run regressions 
where only individual characteristics are included among the control variables, whereas the family 
background is summarized in a single variable – the student’s parental escs index
20. In particular, in 
order to analyse the differential impact of school compositional variables and tracking on family 
background, we interact the individual family background effect with the early-tracking dummy, the 
average and the standard deviation of school parental escs respectively. Also consistently with the 
existing literature, we interact the individual escs with possible confounding factors in order to 
isolate the pure effect of heterogeneity and tracking on background. These confounding factors are 
four country-level features: the duration of pre-primary school, the share of public schools, the 
average students/teachers ratio and the per-capita spending in education
21. Besides, following 
Schuetz et al. (2008), we run two different sets of regressions, respectively including or excluding 
country fixed effects. 
 Without including country fixed effects (table 11), the usual result that an earlier tracking widen 
the opportunity gap between student from different background is strongly confirmed even if all the 
caveat due to the incorrect identification of the true effect of tracking in cross-sections should be 
kept in mind here (Hanushek and Woessmann 2006; Ammermueller 2005; Waldinger 2006). More 
to the point, the “escs” coefficient is twice as large in early tracking with respect to comprehensive 
systems in separated regressions, whereas the interaction term between tracking and “escs” is large, 
positive and significant in pooled ones. However, it is worth to emphasize that such significance 
disappears when interactions between “escs” and school composition variables, i.e. the degree of 
heterogeneity, are also added. This finding adds new insights to the growing literature on tracking 
and equality of opportunities (see Brunello and Checchi 2007) since the effect of tracking appears 
as spurious and largely driven by school compositional variables. 
                                                 
20 Results presented in tables 6 and 7 are robust to the use of different background variables instead or the escs (e.g. 
parental highest occupational status or educational attainment). Detailed results are available upon request by authors. 
21 The interaction with the share of students enrolled in pre-primary school (a further potential confounding factor 
highlighted by Schuetz et al. 2008 and Brunello and Checchi 2007) has not been included since we did not found 
reliable data for Korea and Ireland. Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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Looking to the effect of school compositional variables per se, in all the empirical specifications 
considered (table 11) a higher average background significantly reinforces the peer impact on the 
individual attainment, while the opposite happens regarding the impact of schoolmates 
heterogeneity: i.e. a higher heterogeneity offsets the impact of family background. Interestingly, this 
reduction is higher in early tracking countries where the socio-economic gradient is much higher.  
When country fixed effects are included (table 12), school compositional variables keep the 
same sign and high significance, but the size of the interaction between the “escs” and the degree of 
heterogeneity becomes similar in the two tracking systems. More puzzling is the inversion in the 
size of the family background effect that turns out to be higher in comprehensive schooling systems. 
All in all, school compositional variables affect equity in the way expected by the theory (e.g. 
Benabou 1996). In turn, including these variables makes the negative impact of early tracking on 
opportunity equalization less limpid suggesting that school compositional variables should be 
included in future, more detailed analyses. Finally, the effect of mixing student by background 
appears socially desirable both in terms of equity and efficiency in early tracking systems.    
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
 
The main effort of this paper has been devoted to study the impact of peer heterogeneity in different 
tracking regimes. It has been shown that peer heterogeneity does have an impact on both efficiency 
and equity. Whereas a higher heterogeneity leads to a substantial levelling of the educational 
opportunities in both systems, the impact of heterogeneity on efficiency is opposite in schooling 
systems with different school tracking policies. In early-tracking systems, peer heterogeneity has a 
positive but non-linear impact on student outcomes. In comprehensive ones, instead, heterogeneity 
negatively affects student outcomes but this result is largely driven by pupils attending 
vocationally-oriented programs. This result holds both in school- and in individual-level regression 
leading us to conclude that the effect of heterogeneity is correctly identified. In turn, the linear 
impact of peers is far larger in early tracking systems and seems correctly identified either by 
adding controls correlated with the school selection process or by using school-level fixed effects.  
   All these findings point, as a possible explanation, to a different way in which the tracking age 
affects the sorting of students by unobservable characteristics. For instance, in order to avoid the 
vocational streaming, better students might put more efforts to signal their higher abilities and 
motivations sooner in early tracking systems. If this is the case, the unobservable degree of 
heterogeneity should be lower in early tracking systems and, hence, policies attempting to enhance 
the opportunities of disadvantaged students should intervene before tracking occurs. Further Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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empirical researches should investigate more carefully the effect of early tracking and school 
admittance policies on student sorting by both ability and background.     
A final caveat is required to use these results for policy purposes. The significant impact of peer 
heterogeneity on student performance is rather small both in comprehensive and in early-tracking 
systems, hence favouring student mobility and the mixing of background might have a cost well-
above the benefits in terms of efficiency. Also, the large variation in the factors affecting the 
selection of student by schools of different quality, both within- and between-country, would 
require further analyses to obtain more limpid policy implications regarding the scope of policies 
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Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics of PISA 2006 selected variables 

















































Austria  10  4  518.4 13.8 0.23 2.05  0.69  0.12  0.10  0.87 0.60 0.44  0.69  0.22 
Czech  Rep.  11  5  520.5 13.5 0.07 1.86  0.66 0.02  0.02 0.91  0.35  0.43 0.45  0.20 
Germany  10  4  523.1 14.2 0.32 2.86  0.78  0.17  0.13  0.89 0.59 0.00  0.40  0.65 
Hungary 11  4  514.  1    12.8  -0.01  2.13  0.71  0.02  0.01  0.81  0.31  0.62  0.70  0.01 
Slovak Rep.  11  4  493.7  13.3  -0.10  2.19  0.74  0.00  0.14  0.88  0.25  0.46  0.50  0.17 
Belgium  12  6  512.5 13.8 0.18 2.67  0.79  0.13  0.19  0.37 0.56 0.47  0.26  0.02 
Netherlands  12  6  525.8 13.7 0.25 2.61  0.78 0.11  0.07 0.32  0.19  0.30 0.66  0.10 









   Switzerland  12  6  515.1 13.4 0.10 2.94  0.79  0.23  0.19  0.93 0.24 0.07  0.54  0.82 
Italy 14  8  479.0  12.5  -0.05  3.06  0.82  0.04  0.13  0.92  0.54  0.57  0.07  0.11 
Korea 14  9  522.  9  13.2  -0.01  2.30  0.70  0.00  0.00  0.55  0.12  0.24  0.60  0.22 
Greece 15  9  481.3  13.4  -0.09  2.92  0.80  0.05  0.03  0.95  0.89  0.15  0.05  0.71 
Ireland 15  6  508.6  12.9  -0.01  2.21  0.74  0.08  0.06  0.40  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.42 
Japan 15  9  532.0  14.0  -0.01  1.72  0.60  0.00  0.00  0.74  0.44  0.24  0.87  0.20 
Portugal 15  9  488.7  9.9  -0.52  4.19  1.01  0.05  0.02  0.89  0.48  0.14  0.06  0.56 
Australia  16  10  527.3 13.2 0.21 1.83  0.68  0.22  0.09  0.00 0.05 0.10  0.09  0.42 
Canada  16  8  536.3 14.7 0.37 2.28  0.71 0.23  0.15 0.85  0.08  0.00 0.11  0.78 
Denmark  16  9  495.0 14.0 0.30 2.46  0.82  0.08  0.07  0.63 0.16 0.00  0.03  0.55 
Finland  16  9  564.0 14.4 0.25 2.34  0.75  0.02  0.02  0.96 0.49 0.00  0.04  0.75 
Icelend  16  10  489.7 15.1 0.82 2.74  0.81  0.03  0.03  0.96 0.15 0.00  0.01  0.94 
Norway  16  10  485.6 13.8 0.43 1.73  0.68  0.08  0.08  0.96 0.58 0.00  0.00  0.78 
New  Zealand 16  6  529.3 12.8 0.09 2.10  0.72  0.21  0.09  0.93 0.03 0.00  0.10  0.50 
Poland 16  9  497.7  12.2  -0.31  1.75  0.75  0.00  0.01  0.97  0.53  0.00  0.13  0.83 
Spain 16  10  488.9  11.1  -0.31  3.53  0.88  0.07  0.16  0.53  0.29  0.00  0.03  0.68 
Sweden  16  9  502.9 13.8 0.23 2.11  0.70  0.11  0.09  0.88 0.24 0.00  0.01  0.58 


















   US  16  12  491.0 13.6 0.15 1.96  0.75  0.17  0.12  0.87 0.12 0.00  0.08  0.81 
Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. 
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Tab. 2: Correlation matrix between Background Measures 
   escs  pared  hisei  homepos  books at home 
escs 1         
pared 0.769  1       
hisei 0.796  0.461  1     
homepos 0.708  0.321  0.339  1   
books at home
1  0.499 0.323  0.327  0.524  1 
1 The variable books at home has been linearized. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. 
 
Tab. 3: Correlation between escs mean and. escs std. dev. 
   Escs standard deviation  Escs standard deviation related to country escs S.D. 
Early tracking  -0.005  -0.024 
Comprehensive -0.222  -0.151 
All countries  -0.171  -0.119 
1 The variable books at home has been linearized. Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. 
 
 
Tab. 4: Descriptive statistics of PISA 2006 selected school-level variables 
   Early Tracking  Early2: grade track<6  Comprehensive 
Mean SCIE  502.6  502.9  498.8 
Std. Dev. SCIE  73.6  73.3  54.5 
Std. Dev. Escs average  0.49  0.49  0.51 
Std. Dev. Pared average  1.3  1.3  1.5 
Average escs std. dev.    0.75  0.75  0.75 
Average pared std. dev.  2.6  2.6  2.2 
Share of students attending vocational  0.21 (0.39)  0.20 (0.39)  0.1   (0.30) 
Share of immigrants  0.14 (0.19)  0.14 (0.19)  0.07 (0.14) 
Share of students speaking foreign languages  0.13 (0.17)  0.13 (0.17)  0.07 (0.14) 
Share of school no sorting students by ability   0.44 (0.50)  0.43 (0.49)  0.29 (0.45) 
Share of schools that admit according to students records  0.43 (0.49)  0.42 (0.49)  0.19 (0.39) 
Share of schools that admit according to residence  0.46 (0.50)  0.45 (0.50)  0.53 (0.50) 
Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. 
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Tab. 5: School average performances in science in OECD countries
1. OLS regressions
2, 3. 
 SC-1  SC-2  SC-3  SC-4  SC-5 
81.25 81.07 81.04  83.61  80.40 
(2.74) (2.76) (2.73)  (2.44)  (2.66)  Escs average 
0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 -13.38  102.39  106.39  -26.76 
 (7.15)  (57.47)  (50.20)  (7.00)  Escs standard deviation 
 0.061  0.075  0.034  0.000 
   -66.85  -68.25   
   (31.04)  (27.55)    Escs standard deviation^2 
   0.031  0.013   
      39.05 
      (15.07)  Early track* Escs standard deviation 
      0.010 
Groups of Control Variables         
School Location and Class Size  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
School Composition  yes  yes  yes  yes
4 yes 
School Resources  yes  yes  yes  country average  yes 
School Institutions  yes  yes  yes  country average  yes 
Country level controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Number of observations  5,831  5,831  5,831  6,482  5,831 
F 87.6  85.7  84.0  85.0  83.7 
Prob.>F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.6235 0.6245 0.6259  0.6195  0.6297 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
 2 Regressions are run using school sample weights provided in PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the 
estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error and the third to the P value. 
4The share of students enrolled in vocational programme is considered as country 
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Tab. 6: School average performances in science in OECD countries
1 by early and no early tracking countries
2. OLS regressions
3, 4. 
 SC-2  SC-2A
































74.75 81.17 75.62 84.36 74.74 80.47  77.16  95.27  72.09 80.35 76.30 78.18 
(3.21) (4.29) (3.25) (4.22) (3.20) (4.30)  (2.84) (3.56)  (3.40)  (4.33)  (3.36)  (5.01)  Escs average 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 -31.22  11.70  -31.00  12.63  -39.63  136.28 -11.52  99.54 -37.04  135.78  -32.64  15.34 
(6.71) (8.15) (6.77) (8.15)  (56.40)  (57.55) (54.93) (60.00)  (56.85)  (57.47)  (6.89)  (8.89) 
Escs standard  
Deviation 
0.000 0.151 0.000 0.121 0.482 0.018  0.834  0.097  0.515 0.018 0.000 0.084 
     4.80  -72.88  -9.95  -53.24  1.08  -72.81    
     (31.10)  (32.67)  (30.34) (34.57)  (31.42)  (32.59)     
Escs standard  
deviation^2 
       0.877  0.026  0.743 0.124  0.973  0.026    
Groups of Control  
Variables                 
Sc. Loc & Size  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sc. Comp.  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
6 yes
6 yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sc. Resources  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  cnt average cnt average yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sc. Institutions  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  cnt average cnt average yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country level controls yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sc. additional controls                     yes  yes 
Country F.E.                  yes  yes     
Number of obs.  4,319  1,512  4,153  1,678  4,319  1,512  4,835  1,647  4,319  1,512  3,846  1,252 
F  54.5 98.0 54.8 97.4 54.1 94.7  70.4  122.6  65.9 94.4 42.8 78.4 
Prob.>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2 0.5766  0.8046  0.5795  0.7957  0.5766  0.8059  0.5695  0.7863  0.6079  0.806  0.5804  0.8121 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Early track countries are considered those countries where the age of first school tracking is before 13
. 3 Regressions are run using 
school sample weights provided in PISA database. 
4 For each variable, the first row refers to the estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error and the third to the P 
value. 
5 In model SC-2A the split between early and no early track countries is the one proposed by Waldinger (2006), coded in variable early_track2 (see tab. A1). 
6The share of 
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Tab. 7: Students performances in science in OECD countries
1. OLS regressions
2, 3. 
 ST-1  ST-2  ST-3  ST-4  ST-0 
49.57 49.63  48.95  50.10 38.67 
(2.54) (2.50)  (2.71)  (2.54) (6.64)  Peer Escs average 
0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 
-9.53 53.35  23.97  -16.62   
(6.54) (55.23)  (50.01)  (8.08)   
Escs standard  
Deviation 
0.145 0.334  0.632  0.040   
 -36.02  -21.22     
 (30.82)  (28.06)      Escs standard Deviation^2 
 0.243  0.450     
     24.68   
     (12.53)    Early track* Escs standard deviation 
     0.049   
Groups of Control Variables
4         
Individual Characteristics  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Family background  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Peer composition  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
School Location and size  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
School Resources  yes  yes  country average  yes  yes 
School Institutions  yes  yes  country average  yes  yes 
Country level controls  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
School fixed effects
5         yes 
School additional controls          yes 
Students additional controls          yes 
Number of  observations  174,921  174,921  193,467  177,795  126,949 
F 175.5  173.9  208.1  174.1  212.6 
Prob.>F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2 0.3399  0.3400  0.3477  0.3393  0.4183 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the 
estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at the school level - and the third to the P value. 
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are 
included in all regressions. 








Tab. 8: Students performances in science in OECD countries
1 by early and no early tracking countries
2. OLS regressions
3, 4. 
  ST-1 ST-1A



























44.96 60.36 45.28 60.12 45.00 60.07 45.35 60.44 41.66 60.09 
(2.92) (3.71) (2.94) (3.51) (2.89) (3.70) (2.87) (3.71) (3.13) (3.71)  Peer Escs average 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-17.68 13.58 -16.79 13.25  7.51  110.59 -10.16 14.66 -22.84 14.40 
(7.57) (8.57) (7.64) (8.27)  (71.23)  (52.95) (8.05) (9.80) (7.59) (8.65) 
Escs standard 
Deviation 
0.020 0.113 0.028 0.109 0.916 0.037 0.207 0.135 0.003 0.096 
     -14.36  -56.32      
     (39.37)  (29.48)      
Escs Standard  
Deviation^2 
     0.715  0.056      
       -68.25  -6.68    
       (20.55)  (15.24)    
Vocational*Escs  
standard deviation 
       0.001  0.661    
Groups of  Control Variables
4            
Individual  characteristics  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Family  Background  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Peer  composition  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School Location and Size  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
School  Resources  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
School  Institutions  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country  level  controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country  fixed  effects           yes  yes 
Number  of  observations  132,104 42,817 124,046 50,875 132,104 42,817 132,104 42,817 132,104 42,817 
F  121.9 149.9 119.8 149.2 121.3 146.9 122.6 148.0 133.6 148.2 
Prob.>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2  0.314 0.5455  0.3143  0.5323 0.314 0.5459 0.3147 0.5455 0.3245 0.5459 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the 
estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at the school level - and the third to the P value. 
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are 
included in all regressions. 
5 In model ST-1A the split between early and no early track countries is the one proposed by Waldinger (2006), coded in variable early_track2 (see 
tab. A1). Source: elaborations on PISA 2006 data. 
 Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
  32
Tab. 9: Students performances in science in OECD countries
1 by early and no early tracking countries
2. OLS regressions
3, 4, including additional 
school and student controls and quintile of school escs average by country fixed effects 

















38.13 53.76 37.70 48.05 37.40  48.08 
(3.11) (3.71) (7.59) (8.37) (7.48)  (8.37)  Peer Escs average 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
-10.48  12.00 -6.73 11.33 -40.83 127.95 
(7.26) (8.18) (7.16) (8.49) (49.49) (51.49)  Escs standard deviation 
0.149 0.143 0.348 0.182 0.409  0.013 
     19.23  -67.50 
     (27.27)  (28.19)  Escs Standard Deviation^2 
     0.481  0.017 
Groups of  Control Variables
4         
Individual  characteristics  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Family  Background  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Peer  composition  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Sc. Loc & Size  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sc.  Resources  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Sc.  Institutions  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Country  level  controls  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
School fixed effects
5     yes  yes  yes  yes 
School  additional  controls  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Students  additional  controls  yes yes yes yes yes  yes 
Number  of  observations  94,656 32,293 94,656 32,293 94,656  32,293 
F 113.0  119.9  93.2  108.3  93.0  106.6 
Prob.>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
R
2  0.3797 0.5778 0.3981 0.5824 0.3982  0.5831 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA database. 
3 For each variable, the first row refers to the 
estimated coefficient, the second to the robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at the school level - and the third to the P value. 
4 Imputation dummies for missing data are 
included in all regressions. 
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Tab. 10: Students performances in science in OECD countries
1 by early and no early tracking countries. Estimated coefficients by model ST-1 of 
“Peer escs average” and “Escs standard deviation”. Quantile regressions
2. 
  Peer Escs average  Escs standard deviation 
Percentile  No early track countries  Early track countries  No early track countries  Early track countries 
10  46.38*** 63.75*** -22.38*** 16.18*** 
20  45.36*** 61.40*** -22.60*** 15.38*** 
30 45.89***  60.94***  -18.40***  8.39*** 
40  46.39*** 58.28*** -23.56*** 12.06*** 
50  45.29*** 60.57*** -24.54*** 11.75*** 
60 44.12***  63.20***  -21.35***  7.44*** 
70  45.01*** 60.97*** -15.79*** 12.52*** 
80  42.11*** 59.29*** -16.43*** 11.27*** 
90  41.08*** 57.26*** -12.42*** 22.05*** 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA database.
 Robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at 
the school level have been computed. 
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Tab. 11: School composition, educational policies and inequality of opportunity: interactions with student level family background effects.  
OLS regressions. No country fixed effects. 
  Pooled  No early track countries  Early track countries 
Escs 26.32***  50.64*** 40.13***  105.26*** 
escs*early track  2.87*        1.18     
escs*peer escs average    9.93*** 10.10*** 11.09*** 
escs*escs standard deviation   -21.09***  -17.72***  -29.40*** 
Controls        
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Interactions with counfounding factors         
Escs*Dur_preprimary -2.50***  -1.94***  -2.27***  -8.80*** 
Escs*Public_cnt 1.14  0.14  1.96  16.50*** 
Escs*Stratio_cnt 1.29***  0.99*** 1.46***  -1.16** 
Escs*Educ_spending 0.00 0.00*  0.00  0.00*** 
Country Fixed effects  No  No  No  No 
Number of observations  202,804  202,804  154,719  48,085 
F 447.5  393.4  322.2  245.9 
Prob.>F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2 0.1839  0.1879  0.1746  0.3168 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA database.
 Robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at 
the school level have been computed. 
 Imputation dummies for missing data are included in all regressions. *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level. * 90% 

















Tab. 12: School composition, educational policies and inequality of opportunity: interactions with student level family background effects. 
OLS regressions. Country fixed effects. 
  Pooled  No early track countries  Early track countries 
Escs 25.57***  55.42*** 44.02***  94.90*** 
escs*early track  -3.91***  -5.91***     
escs*peer escs average    11.66*** 11.73*** 10.99*** 
escs*escs standard deviation   -26.66***  -25.33***  -28.23*** 
Controls        
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Interactions with counfounding factors         
Escs*Dur_preprimary -2.56***  -1.93***  -1.85***  -5.42** 
Escs*Public_cnt 4.67**  3.64* 7.69***  12.11*** 
Escs*Stratio_cnt 1.18***  0.85*** 1.51***  -1.24** 
Escs*Educ_spending 0.00  0.00** 0.00***  0.00*** 
Country Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  202,804  202,804  154,719  48,085 
F 232.7  222.6  237.5  220.5 
Prob.>F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R
2 0.2328  0.2385  0.2217  0.3361 
1 Mexico, Turkey and France are not included. 
2 Regressions are run using students sample weights provided in PISA database.
 Robust standard error – adjusted for clustering at 
the school level have been computed. 
 Imputation dummies for missing data are included in all regressions. *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level. * 90% 









 Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
  36
 










































.5 1 1.5 2
escs standard deviation






































































































.5 1 1.5 2
escs std. dev.




 Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
  38
 




















.5 1 1.5 2
escs standard deviation





 Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
 
  39




Fig. 4: Quantile regressions on students performances in science in OECD countries. Estimated coefficients of “Peer Escs 
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Fig. 5: Quantile regressions on students performances in science in OECD countries. Estimated coefficients of “Escs 
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  Tab. A1: Control variables used in regressions 
School level controls 
School Location and Class Sizes 
School Location   4 dummies: village, small town, town, city (large city is the omitted modality) 
Class sizes  5 dummies: less than 15, 16-20, 26-30, 31-35, more than 35 (21-25 is the omitted modality) 
School resources 
Ratcomp  Ratio of computers to school size 
Compweb  Proportion of computers connected to web 
Stratio Student-Teacher  ratio 
Scmatedu  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Quality of educational resources" 
Tcshort  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Teacher shortage" (on a negative scale) 
School Institutions 
Respres  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Responsibility for resource allocation index" 
Respcurr  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "Responsibility for curriculum & assessment" 
School type  3 dummies: public, private dependent, private independent ("missing school type" is the omitted modality, due to the several missing 
values of the school type variable) 
Residence  Dummy variable showing if residence is a prerequisite or a high priority for being admitted to the school 
Student record  Dummy variable showing if previous academic   records (or a specific test) are a prerequisite or a high priority for being admitted to the 
school 
N.B. the dummies showing the single components of school autonomy and responsibility about resource and curricula (the modalities of the scq11 school Pisa 
questionnaire) have not been included because of the several missing values. Replacing these variables with the respres and respcurr indexes (with much less 
missing values) does not alter regression results. 
School Additional Controls 
Sorting by ability  Two dummies from the 3 modalities of the ability group variable showing, respectively, if students are grouped according to their 
abilities within schools for all subjects of for some subjects 
School competition  Two dummies capturing the degree of school competition in the area. 
Principal evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are used in the evaluation of the principal's performance 
Teacher evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are used in the evaluation of teachers' performance 
Allocation evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are used in decisions about instructional resource allocation to the school 
Over time evaluation  Dummy variable showing if achievements are tracked over time by an administrative authority 
School composition 
Average age   Average age of interviewed students  
Share of females  Share of females among interviewed students  
Share of immigrants  Share of immigrants among interviewed students  Peer Heterogeneity, Parental Background and Tracking: Evidence from PISA 2006 
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Share of "foreign 
languages" 
Share of interviewed students which speak a foreign language at home. 
Share of vocational 
students 
Share of interviewed students enrolled in a vocational programme. 
Escs average  Average level of the escs index of interviewed students  
Escs standard 
deviation 
Standard deviation (corrected for the country escs standard deviation) of the escs index of interviewed students  
Escs variance  Square of the escs standard deviation 
N.B. in regressions at student level these variables (apart from escs standard deviation and variance) are considered net of the individual responses. 
Country level controls 
Gdp per capita   
Spending in education per capita 
Age of first track   
Early_track  Dummy variable: 1 if school track occurs before age 13, 0 otherwise 




External exam  Share of students subjected to an external evaluation in science 
Standard test  Share of students subjected to standard evaluation tests in science 




Grade  Students below grade 8 and beyond grade 11 are excluded from the sample; hence, grade is captured by 3 dummies 
Vocational  Dummy variable: 1 if the student is enrolled in a vocational programme, 0 otherwise 
Isced 3  Dummy variable: 1 if the student is enrolled in an upper secondary, 0 otherwise 
Immigrant  Dummy variable: 1 if the student was not born in the country of test, 0 otherwise 
Foreign Language  Dummy variable: 1 if the student speaks a foreign language at home, 0 otherwise 
Family background 
Hisei  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset showing "the highest parental occupational status" 
Pared  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset showing (in years) "the highest parental educational level" 
Homepos  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset about "home possessions" 
Books at home  Five dummies on number of books: 11-25, 26-100, 101-200, 201-500, more than 500 (less than 11 is the omitted modality)  
Escs  Quantitative index provided in PISA 2006 dataset showing the "Family economic, social and cultural status" Michele Raitano and Francesco Vona 
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Student Additional Controls 
Time science at 
school 
Two dummies about the number of hours spent studying science at school per week: 2-4 and more than 4 (less than 2 is the omitted 
modality) 




Two dummies about the number of hours spent studying science in out of school lessons per week: 2-4 and more than 4 (less than 2 is 
the omitted modality) 
Imputation dummies 
Intercept dummies  One dummy for each imputed variable (concerning escs, pared, hisei, homepos, immigrant, foreign language) showing if the value 
has been imputed 
Slope dummies  One dummy for each imputed variable (concerning escs, pared, hisei, homepos, immigrant, foreign language) showing the 
interaction between the intercept imputation dummy and the value of the imputed variable 
 
 
 
 